Introduction
Equilibrium wage-employment contracts that result from worker-…rm negotiations are determined by three distinct characteristics of the bargaining framework:
(1) Labor organization: bargaining can take place (i) collectively between workers organized in a union and the …rm or (ii) at the individual level between each worker and the …rm.
(2) Bargaining scope: bargaining issues involve (i) only wages, in which case the …rm retains the right to determine employment unilaterally or (ii) wages and working conditions (e.g. employment, worker e¤ort, capital-to-labor ratio).
(3) (In)completeness of the contract: the workers and the …rm agree upon (i) a binding contract that commits either party to future wage and employment decisions or (ii) a non-binding contract where either party can call for renegotiations before production starts.
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As a benchmark, consider a neoclassical (NC) (non-bargaining) …rm that writes binding contracts with its workers at the reservation wage. The properties of two binding equilibrium wageemployment contracts are widely known in the collective bargaining literature. The right-to-manage bargaining (RTM) model postulates that the union bargains with the …rm over wages (Nickell and Andrews, 1983) . Compared to the NC …rm, underemployment emerges. The union and the …rm agree on a Pareto-ine¢ cient contract. To obtain Pareto e¢ ciency, the e¢ cient bargaining (EB) model requires that the union and the …rm negotiate simultaneously over wages and employment (McDonald and Solow, 1981) . Under the assumption of a risk-neutral union, the underemployment result of the RTM model disappears. Stole and Zwiebel (SZ) (1996a, 1996b) formalize intra…rm wage bargaining between the …rm and its individual risk-neutral employees who are irreplaceable and cannot be contractually tied to the …rm. In equilibrium, the SZ …rm overhires relative to the NC …rm to such an extent that bargained wages are driven down to the reservation wage. Extending the SZ analysis, de Fontenay and Gans (FG) (2003) introduce an outside pool of ready-to-employ replacement workers. Such a …nite pool makes it no longer optimal for the …rm to overemploy. Moreover, insiders still capture a wage rent since losing an employee brings the …rm closer to running out of replacement workers. Therefore, the FG …rm underhires relative to the NC …rm.
Whereas SZ and FG study individual wage bargaining, many real world labor markets are characterized by union wage bargaining. Capturing this institutional feature, our paper contributes to the collective bargaining literature by investigating how unionization a¤ects equilibrium wages and pro…ts in a non-binding contract setting. Following the binding collective bargaining literature, we assume that the conventional generalized Nash bargaining solution is the appropriate solution concept and that the union and the …rm are risk neutral. A common assumption in binding collective bargaining models is that all employed union members return to the external labor market when negotiations fail. However, in the presence of non-binding contracts, it is not sensible to prevent workers from making individual employment decisions, even within a unionized …rm. Therefore, the unique feature of our model is that, consistent with the SZ bargaining environment, a dissatis…ed worker is free to quit and/or the …rm is free to dismiss an individual worker. Hence, we allow the union to renegotiate with the …rm in a …nite sequence of bargaining sessions with each time one employee less in the …rm. As such, our analysis enables to verify whether the SZ overemployment and the FG underemployment results are robust to a change in the labor organization.
Our pronounced result is that equilibrium wages, pro…ts and employment of our non-binding collective wage bargaining setting are equivalent to the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of the binding EB setting. The important corollary is that due to unionization, the SZ overemployment result disappears. We also show that the availability and the size of a …nite replacement pool leaves the wage-employment equilibrium unchanged. These …ndings allow to conclude that due to unionization, the FG underemployment result disappears. Finally, to provide a game-theoretical characterization of our equilibrium wages and pro…ts, we demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and pro…ts coincide with the Owen values of the cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
The striking lesson that can be learned from our equivalence result is that starting from the RTM framework, a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome can be obtained by changing the type of contract from binding to non-binding instead of changing the bargaining scope from wages to wages and employment. This alternative route of reaching Pareto e¢ ciency is absent in standard labor economics textbooks that advocate changing the framework from RTM to EB.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the equilibrium nonbinding wage-employment contract under risk-neutrality in a collective bargaining setting, shows the equivalence between our outcome and the outcome of binding risk-neutral e¢ cient bargaining and investigates the role of a replacement pool on the equilibrium wage-employment contract. The cooperative game-theoretical characterization of our equilibrium wages and pro…ts is provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts
Model
In this section, we describe our model heuristically; in Appendix we provide a non-cooperative bargaining game in extensive form that analytically underpins our model. Essential for our analysis is the assumption that labor contracts are non-binding with no capability to bind either party to future wage and employment decisions. Hence, the union and the …rm can engage in an arbitrary number of pairwise negotiations prior to production in which the union can costlessly re-open negotiations over the individual wages of its employed members with the …rm and vice versa. Such a renegotiation occurs when a dissatis…ed worker decides to quit and/or the …rm decides to dismiss an individual worker. We allow the union to renegotiate with the …rm on behalf of all remaining employees when any employee leaves the …rm. An employee who returns to the external labor market can never re-enter the …rm and stays a union member earning the reservation wage. In Section 2.2, we assume that employees are irreplaceable. We relax the irreplaceability assumption in Section 2.3. We assume risk-neutral employees with individual utilities equal to wages. Union preferences are represented by a utilitarian objective function. We assume generalized Nash bargaining. The bargaining scope is negotiation over wages alone.
We present a discrete version of the model, but results easily extend when labor is assumed to be continuous. Consider a …xed-size union of N 2 N members. A subset of n union members (the employees) work in the …rm. We assume that the union is su¢ ciently large to cover labor demand (n N ). We endogenize the choice of n later on. Wages are generically denoted by w. The reservation wage is w. We denotew(n) the employee's wage in our non-binding setting when there are n employees. The …rm utilizes a single asset, increasing and diminishing returns production function F (n) : N ! R + . We assume that F (i) iw for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng for reasons of incentive compatibility that will become clear later on. Denote F (n) F (n) F (n 1) the …rst di¤erence operator. The pro…t function is generically denoted by (n) : N ! R. The neoclassical …rm's pro…t function equals N C (n) F (n) nw. The …rm's pro…t function in this non-binding setting equals (n) F (n) nw(n). We denote the bargaining power of the union by 2 [0; 1].
Equivalence with e¢ cient bargaining
We are looking for the bargaining outcome (or contract) that is (i) e¢ cient, i.e. iw(i) +~ (i) = F (i) for all i n, (ii) stable, i.e. for any given bargaining power, neither the union nor the …rm can respectively improve wages or pro…ts in a pairwise renegotiation and (iii) incentive compatible with respect to w, i.e.w(i) w for all i n implying that the employees'outside option constraint is not violated.
Our main result is stated in Proposition 1. Proposition 1. Under risk neutrality, the outcome of the non-binding collective wage bargaining framework coincides with the outcome of the binding e¢ cient bargaining framework.
Proof. Under utilitarian union preferences, the union's payo¤ when there are n employees equals nw(n) + (N n)w. The union's payo¤ when there are n 1 employees equals (n 1)w(n 1) + (N n + 1)w. Hence, the union's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals nw(n) (n 1)w(n 1) w. The …rm's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals (n) ~ (n 1). The outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to
We derive the equilibrium contract inductively over the number of employees. Consider the case where only one employee is present. Let F (0) = 0. From the …rst-order condition of the logarithm of Eq. (1), we obtain~
Note thatw(1) is incentive compatible by assumption. Now consider the case where two employees are present. We obtain~
Note thatw (2) is incentive compatible by assumption. Generalizing the above argument over any n by induction, we obtain as the solution to the …rst-order di¤erence equation above the following expressions forw(n) and~ (n):w
Eqs. (2) and (3) easily rewrite when directly using the production function rather than the marginal products:w
Note thatw(n) is incentive compatible by assumption. 1 From Eq. (5), it follows that the optimal employment level in our setting, denoted byñ , coincides with the optimal employment level of the neoclassical …rm, denoted by n N C .
Under EB, the outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to
Maximization of Eq. (6) with respect to the wage and employment gives the following two …rst-order conditions respectively:
Solving Eqs. (7) and (8) simultaneously gives the expression for the contract curve: F (n) = w. Hence, the optimal level of employment under risk-neutral e¢ cient bargaining, denoted n EB , coincides with n N C and, as we just showed, withñ . From Eqs. (4) and (7), it follows that w(ñ ) = w EB (n EB ). As a result,~ (ñ ) = EB (n EB ).
We provide an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 1. The driving force behind the result is that when a …rm bargains with a union in a non-binding contract setting over wages alone, the …rm cannot determine employment afterwards unilaterally anymore. This is due to the stability requirement of the contract. Suppose that the union and the …rm agree upon a wagew(ñ ). However, assume that max n~ (n) = n 0 >ñ . The …rm chooses employment level n 0 , after which the union and the …rm want to renegotiatew(n 0 ), contradicting thatw(ñ ) was stable. In other words, although at the outset the union and the …rm bargain only over wages in a non-binding contract setting, they implicitly have to reach a binding agreement on wages and employment in the end. The latter is exactly the objective of union-…rm bargaining in an EB framework.
Proposition 1 allows to investigate whether the SZ overemployment result is robust to a change in the labor organization. The answer is negative since the optimal level of employment in our setting coincides with the one of an NC …rm. Hence, we obtain the following corollary. Corollary 1. Due to unionization, the SZ overemployment result disappears in a non-binding contract setting.
The role of a replacement pool
In the previous section, we assume that employees are irreplaceable. Alternatively, the union could deploy its union members outside the …rm to provide the …rm with a …nite, ready-to-employ replacement pool. More speci…cally, we again assume that an employee who leaves the …rm can never return to the …rm and stays a union member earning the reservation wage. However, the …rm can now immediately draw upon the replacement pool to substitute the latter. The question in terms of application is whether …rms have such a replacement pool available. The answer is most likely a¢ rmative when untrained or low-skilled employees are involved. It is well documented that for such employees, negotiations with the …rm typically occur collectively rather than individually, making our setting most relevant.
We obtain Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In a non-binding collective wage bargaining framework, the availability and the size of a …nite replacement pool leaves the wage-employment equilibrium unchanged.
Proof. It is su¢ cient to show that the equilibrium wage in a non-binding collective bargaining setting is not a¤ected by the availability and the size of a replacement pool. Denote the employee's wage byw N n (n) where the subscript indicates the number of unionized ready-to-employ workers outside the …rm and the number in parentheses indicates the number of employees. Similarly, the …rm's pro…t equals~ N n (n). The union's payo¤ in case the …rm does not draw upon the replacement pool equals nw N n (n) + (N n)w. The union's payo¤ in case the …rm replaces an employee equals nw N n 1 (n) + (N n)w. Hence, the union's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals n (w N n (n) w N n 1 (n)). The …rm's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals~ N n (n) ~ N n 1 (n). The outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to
From the …rst-order condition of the logarithm of Eq. (9), we obtaiñ
From induction over the number of unionized ready-to-employ workers, we obtain thatw N n (n) = w N n 1 (n) = : : : =w 1 (n) =w 0 (n). It is easy to check that the result holds for any number of employees, i.e.w N i (i) =w 0 (i) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
We give an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 2. Suppose that for a given employment level n, the union and the …rm agree upon a wage scheme that negatively depends on the size of the replacement pool. Consider n employees and N n unionized ready-to-employ workers. In this case, the …rm wants to keep the replacement pool as large as possible in order to reduce the wage bill. However, the union has an incentive to deploy the replacement pool in order to increase the total sum of union members' wages. As a result, the wage scheme cannot be stable. A similar argument, where the incentives of the …rm and the union are reversed, holds when the wage scheme depends positively on the replacement pool.
Propositions 1 & 2 allow to answer the question whether the FG underemployment result is robust to a change in the labor organization. The answer is negative since the presence of a replacement pool does not a¤ect the wage-employment equilibrium and the latter coincides with the binding EB equilibrium. Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Due to unionization, the FG underemployment result disappears in a non-binding contract setting with a …nite replacement pool.
We end Section 2 by commenting on the e¤ect of abstaining from the risk-neutrality assumption. Importantly, since the equivalence between our contract and the e¢ cient bargaining contract is driven by the stability requirement, this equivalence would still hold if workers were risk-averse (risk-loving). In other words, risk-neutrality is not needed to obtain Proposition 1. However, as the Pareto-e¢ cient contract lies on a negatively (positively) sloped contract curve, the optimal employment level no longer coincides with neoclassical employment, leading to underemployment (overemployment). As a result, without imposing risk neutrality, Corollaries 1 & 2 would no longer hold.
A cooperative game-theoretical characterization
This section provides di¤erent cooperative game-theoretical characterizations of our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and pro…ts.
Consider the (n + 1)-player cooperative game (N; v), where N = f0; 1; : : : ; ng is the set of players in which we index the …rm as 0 and the employees as the positive integers 1 to n. The mapping v : 2 jN j ! R represents the characteristic function, assigning to any possible coalition S N a real number v (S) called the value of coalition S. The value of the empty coalition equals zero, i.e. v (;) = 0. Any coalition S excluding the …rm does not have access to the …rm's production process and obtains its outside option, i.e. v (S) = jSj w when 0 = 2 S. Any coalition S including the …rm engages in production, i.e. v (S) = F (jSj 1) when 0 2 S. The value of the grand coalition equals v (N ) = F (jN j 1) = F (n). Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) 
The 2-player cooperative game
Before establishing a cooperative game-theoretical characterization of our collective bargaining nonbinding wage-employment contract in the (n + 1)-player cooperative game, we …rst consider the 2-player cooperative game (f0; 1g ; v), denoting the …rm as 0 and the union consisting of n employees as 1. For this 2-player game, it holds that v (;) = v (0) = 0, v (1) = nw and v (0; 1) = F (n).
We obtain Proposition 3.
Proposition 3.
If the …rm's bargaining power equals 1 =2 , then workers' wages equal the Shapley value of the union divided by the number of employees and the …rm's pro…t equals its Shapley value.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that~ (n) = . We obtain Proposition 4. = , the reader can check that Sh 0 (N; v; ) = (1 ) (F (n) nw) = (n) and Sh 1 (N; v; ) = nw + (F (n) nw) = F (n) + (1 )nw = nw(n).
The (n + 1)-player cooperative game
The previous section allows for a characterization of equilibrium wages and pro…ts in terms of (weighted) Shapley values. Returning to the (n + 1)-player cooperative game (N; v), we obtain an alternative characterization in terms of modi…ed Shapley values, known as Owen values (Owen, 1977) , that takes into account possible coalitional structures that may form between players. The standard textbook interpretation of the Shapley value is that of a queue of players, where each player is entering a room and is obtaining her marginal contribution to the coalition of players already present in the room. In case of the Shapley value, all queues are formed with equal probability and the Shapley value is precisely the expected marginal contribution to coalitions with respect to this random order of players. In contrast, the Owen value restricts the possible formation of queues according to the coalitional structure. We formally de…ne a coalitional structure B = fS 1 ; : : : ; S m g which partitions N into m disjoint subsets. Let ! be a permutation on N and let be the set of all permutations on N . De…ne (B) as the subset of , which includes only the orders in which players of the same component of B appear successively; i.e. (B) = f! 2 : if i; j 2 S k and !(i) < !(l) < !(j), then l 2 S k g. Then, the Owen value assigns to each player her expected marginal contribution to the coalition of preceding players with respect to a uniform distribution over the set of orders in (B); i.e.
) for all i 2 N , where
In our framework, B = fS 1 ; S 2 g where S 1 = f0g is containing the …rm, and S 2 = f1; : : : ; ng is containing the workers.
We obtain Proposition 5. Proof. First, consider the …rm. Note that, given the coalitional structure B, the …rm enters either …rst or last in the order of players, implying that ( B) = 2n!. The marginal contribution of the …rm entering …rst equals 0, the marginal contribution of the …rm entering last equals F (n) nw.
The result for the workers' wages follows by noting that (i) the cooperative game among workers when the …rm is absent is inessential, implying that O i B; v = O j B; v for all i; j 2 S 2 and that (ii) Owen values satisfy e¢ ciency with respect to the grand coalition, implying that
Proposition 5 can be generalized for any bargaining power 2 [0; 1] in terms of "weighted" Owen values in the cooperative game with coalitional structure B. However, to the best of our knowledge, the latter solution concept is not yet de…ned in the literature (for any coalitional structure B) and doing so goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, for our speci…c coalitional structure B, an elegant interpretation can be given which resembles Owen (1968)'s original interpretation of the weights of the weighted Shapley value as a measure of players'delay to reach the grand coalition. Owen showed that the introduction of weights amounts to distorting the equal probabilities with which queues form in the following way: the higher the weight of a player, the higher the probability of the queues in which this player arrives the last. In our setting with coalitional structure B and the …rm's bargaining power equal to 1=2, the …rm ends up at either end of the order with equal probability, yielding the Owen value of 1=2 times the …rm's marginal contribution to the grand coalition (remember that the marginal contribution of the …rm entering …rst equals zero). Generalizing, with coalitional structure B and the …rm's bargaining power equal to (1 ), the …rm's bargaining power exactly re ‡ects the probability that the …rm enters the last in the order of players, yielding the "weighted" Owen value of (1 ) times the …rm's marginal contribution to the grand coalition.
Conclusion
To represent a widespread, institutional characteristic of contemporary labor markets, this paper introduces collective bargaining in a non-binding contract setting where the …rm and its risk-neutral employees bargain over wages alone. We show that the wage-employment equilibrium coincides with the outcome of the binding e¢ cient bargaining framework. The driving force behind this result is that, due to the stability requirement in a non-binding contract setting, the …rm is not able to determine employment unilaterally even if bargaining is over wages alone. The availability and the size of a …nite replacement pool leaves the wage-employment equilibrium unchanged. These …ndings allow to conclude that due to unionization, the Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b ) overemployment result and the de Fontenay and Gans (2003) underemployment result disappear. Furthermore, the …rm and the workers receive their expected marginal contribution of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from all workers being represented by a single union.
Within our static collective non-binding bargaining framework, an evident continuation is to explore applications regarding hiring decisions, technological choice and organizational design. Furthermore, if data on labor contract speci…cities were available, our equivalence result would provide the foundation of an original test of Pareto e¢ ciency in the empirical collective bargaining literature. An interesting extension of our framework, following Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , is to introduce worker heterogeneity and to study the formation of multi-union patterns, possibly exploited by the …rm to its advantage. Within each bargaining session, the union and the …rm play the alternating-o¤er bargaining game of Binmore et al. (1986) in which there is an exogenous probability of breakdown following each rejected o¤er. Breakdown probabilities di¤er following a rejection by the …rm or the union. The game is described as follows. Starting with the …rm, the …rm and the union alternate wage proposals. If a proposal is accepted, negotiations terminate. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with probability p f if a rejection is made by the …rm and with probability p u if a rejection is made by the union. When a breakdown does not occur, the rejecting party makes a counterproposal. Proposals are made until one is accepted or a breakdown occurs. There is no discounting. It is straightforward to demonstrate that every bargaining power 2 [0; 1] is consistent for some pair of probabilities (p f ; p u ) in the following way:
We look for the limiting outcome as breakdown probabilities approach zero. Binmore et al. (1986) show that for such a bargaining session the generalized Nash bargaining solution emerges.
